Reference:
Execution:
Main Researchers:
TIN2008-04547
01/Jan/2009 – 01/Dec/2011
Dídac Busquets
Description:
Robust auctions through the incorporation of satisfiability module theories techniques Auctions are mechanisms for distributing goods among a set of agents.
Usually, it is assumed that the result of the auction is a binding contract that has to be fulfilled by the agents. However, this assumption is not valid when the environment in which the auctions are used is a real one, since unexpected events could occur, for which the solutions may not be prepared. Thus, in this project we will focus our research in an innovative field: robust auctions. To this end, we must clearly define what is meant by robustness in the auction domain, as well as develop methods for providing the auctions with a robust behavior. More concretely, we will develop robust auction mechanisms, which should incentivize agents to fulfill the contracts, and also algorithms for generating robust solutions, which should be easily repairable in the case of unexpected events. Moreover, we plan to use logic based techniques, in particular those of satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) to tackle combinatorial problems, such as the auction winner determination problem. Such techniques are highly expressive, and recently there have been huge advances in the efficiency of the solvers. Therefore, in the project we will design logic based methods for solving auctions and other similar combinatorial problems. Moreover, we will also generalize the concept of robustness within the SMT domain.
